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This paper analyzes the influence of transnational non-state actors on compliance with 
international legal rules as part of Michel Foucault’s power/knowledge structure. In 
particular, it examines the effects of the Shooting Back project, organized by the Israeli 
non-governmental organization B’Tselem, on the level of investigations of alleged violations 
of the law of occupation. In 2007, B’Tselem supplied Palestinians living in high-conflict areas 
with video cameras in order to capture, expose, and “seek redress for” human rights violations 
in the Occupied Territories. According to Jeremy Bentham’s principles of panopticism, power 
should be visible and unverifiable. The implementation of these principles by transnational 
actors is highlighted by the Shooting Back project in Israel. This project caused soldiers and 
their commanders to become aware of the possibility that their actions were being observed 
and documented without the exact location or identity of the observer being known. Shooting 
Back also demonstrates the potential role of transnational actors in conflict resolution. Such 
actors can assist in the implementation of Bentham’s principles through the geographical 
spread and use of affordable means of communication.
Cet article analyse l’influence des acteurs transnationaux non étatiques sur la conformité 
aux règles du droit international dans le cadre de la notion de savoir-pouvoir de Michel 
Foucault. Il examine en particulier l’effet du projet Shooting Back, organisé par l’ONG 
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israélienne B’Tselem, sur le niveau d’investigation des violations présumées de la loi 
d’occupation. B’Tselem a fourni en 2007 aux Palestiniens vivant dans les zones de fort conflit 
des caméras vidéo afin de leur permettre de filmer et dénoncer les atteintes aux droits de 
la personne dans les territoires occupés, dans le but d’en « obtenir réparation ». En vertu du 
principe de panoptisme de Jeremy Bentham, le pouvoir doit être à la fois visible et invéri-
fiable. La mise en œuvre de ce principe par des acteurs transnationaux est illustrée par le 
projet israélien Shooting Back. Ce projet a forcé les soldats israéliens et leurs supérieurs à 
considérer la possibilité que leurs gestes soient observés et attestés sans qu’ils sachent ni 
l’identité de l’observateur, ni l’endroit où il se trouve. Shooting Back démontre également le 
rôle potentiel des acteurs transnationaux dans la résolution des conflits. De tels acteurs 
pourraient appliquer le principe de Bentham sur un vaste territoire en utilisant des moyens 
de communication abordables.
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Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of con-
scious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power.1
CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL TRANSNATIONAL SOCIETY is composed of a variety 
of actors. Traditional state actors in the Westphalian sense2 are no longer the 
sole actors in international relations: non-state actors, such as non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), as well as transnational corporations (TNCs), play an 
increasingly important role in international relations and politics.3
1. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated by Alan Sheridan 
(New York: Pantheon Books 1977) at 201 [Foucault, Discipline].
2. See e.g. Peter Stirk, “The Westphalian Model, Sovereignty and Law in Fin-de-siècle German 
International Theory” (2005) 19:2 Int’l Rel 153 at 168; Yale H Ferguson & Richard W 
Mansbach, Remapping Global Politics: History’s Revenge and Future Shock (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 55-56.
3. Menno T Kamminga’s conception of “non-governmental organizations,” which we  use 
here, refers to organizations that have the following five elements: first, NGOs are 
private structures in the sense that they are not established or dominated by states (which 
distinguishes them from intergovernmental organizations); second, their goal is not to 
replace governments by force (as opposed to national liberation movements and armed 
opposition groups); third, while NGOs can aspire to alter governmental policy, they do not 
seek to take control over the government themselves (as opposed to political parties and 
movements); fourth, NGOs are non-self-profitable organizations, even though they can 
employ fundraising and even marketing (unlike business entities); and finally, even though 
some NGOs can sometimes employ civil disobedience, they are mostly law abiding (as 
opposed to criminal groups). See Menno T Kamminga, “The Evolving Status of NGOs 
under International Law: A threat to the Inter-State System?” in Philip Alston, ed, Non-State 
Actors and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 93 at 96. 
 The terms transnational corporations (TNCs), multinational corporations (MNCs), 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), global enterprises, and multinationals are used 
interchangeably in the literature, sometimes with differences between them. As there is no 
single definition of TNC in the literature, for the purposes of this article, the definition of 
the Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations will be used:  
[A]n enterprise, whether of public, private or mixed ownership, comprising entities in two 
or more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which 
operates under a system of decision-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, by 
ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them [may be able to] exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and 
responsibilities with the others.  
 Menno T Kamminga’s conception of “non-governmental organizations,” which we  use 
here, refers to organizations that have the following five elements: first, NGOs are 
private structures in the sense that they are not established or dominated by states (which 
distinguishes them from intergovernmental organizations); second, their goal is not to 
replace governments by force (as opposed to national liberation movements and armed 
opposition groups); third, while NGOs can aspire to alter governmental policy, they do not 
seek to take control over the government themselves (as opposed to political parties and 
movements); fourth, NGOs are non-self-profitable organizations, even though they can 
employ fundraising and even marketing (unlike business entities); and finally, even though 
some NGOs can sometimes employ civil disobedience, they are mostly law abiding (as 
opposed to criminal groups). See Menno T Kamminga, “The Evolving Status of NGOs 
under International Law: A threat to the Inter-State System?” in Philip Alston, ed, Non-State 
Actors and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) 93 at 96. 
 The terms transnational corporations (TNCs), multinational corporations (MNCs), 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), global enterprises, and multinationals are used 
interchangeably in the literature, sometimes with differences between them. As there is no 
single definition of TNC in the literature, for the purposes of this article, the definition of 
the Draft United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations will be used:  
[A]n enterprise, whether of public, private or mixed ownership, comprising entities in two 
or more countries, regardless of the legal form and fields of activity of these entities, which 
operates under a system of decision-making centres, in which the entities are so linked, by 
ownership or otherwise, that one or more of them [may be able to] exercise a significant 
influence over the activities of others, and, in particular, to share knowledge, resources and 
responsibilities with the others.  
 See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the Special Session, UNESCOR, 
1983, Supp No 7, UN Doc E/1983/17/Rev. 1 at 1. For further discussion of TNCs, see 
David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (2003) 97:4 
AJIL 901 at 907-909; Jonathan I Charney, “Transnational Corporations and Developing 
Public International Law” (1983) 32:4 Duke LJ 748 at 749, n 3; Fleur Johns, “The 
Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal 
Theory” (1994) 19:4 Melbourne UL Rev 893 at 893, n 1; Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law, 2d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 5-6; Tania 
Voon, “Multinational Enterprises and State Sovereignty Under International Law” (1999) 
21:2 Adel LR 219 at 220. 
 For discussion of the role played by NGOs, TNCs, and other non-state actors in 
international relations, see e.g. Steven R Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory 
of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111:3 Yale LJ 443 at 446-48; Voon, supra note 3 at 221; 
James N Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 6; Ferguson & Mansbach, supra note 2 at 2; Emeka 
Duruigbo, “Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights Abuses: 
Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges” (2008) 6:2 Nw U J Int’l Hum Rts 222 at 224; 
Johns, supra note 3 at 893; Olga Martin-Ortega, “Business and Human Rights in Conflict” 
(2008) 22:3 Ethics & Int’l Aff 273 at 274 [Olga Martin-Ortega, “Business”]; Pini Pavel 
Miretski, “The Influence of Non-Governmental Actors on Compliance with International 
Law – Compliance with United Nations Security Council Decisions on Angola’s Conflict 
Diamonds” in Noëlle Quénivet & Shilan Shah-Davis, eds, International Law and Armed 
Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2010) 208 at 208-10. 
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This article explores the influence of transnational actors on states’ 
compliance with international legal rules in terms of Michel Foucault’s power/
knowledge structure4 via a study of the Shooting Back5 project initiated by the 
Israeli NGO B’Tselem (The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in 
the Occupied Territories). To that end, this article examines the effect of the 
Shooting Back project on the level of investigations of alleged violations of 
the law of occupation in the Occupied Territories (OT). It does not purport 
 See Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report on the Special Session, UNESCOR, 
1983, Supp No 7, UN Doc E/1983/17/Rev. 1 at 1. For further discussion of TNCs, see 
David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights” (2003) 97:4 
AJIL 901 at 907-909; Jonathan I Charney, “Transnational Corporations and Developing 
Public International Law” (1983) 32:4 Duke LJ 748 at 749, n 3; Fleur Johns, “The 
Invisibility of the Transnational Corporation: An Analysis of International Law and Legal 
Theory” (1994) 19:4 Melbourne UL Rev 893 at 893, n 1; Peter T Muchlinski, Multinational 
Enterprises and the Law, 2d ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 5-6; Tania 
Voon, “Multinational Enterprises and State Sovereignty Under International Law” (1999) 
21:2 Adel LR 219 at 220. 
 For discussion of the role played by NGOs, TNCs, and other non-state actors in 
international relations, see e.g. Steven R Ratner, “Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory 
of Legal Responsibility” (2001) 111:3 Yale LJ 443 at 446-48; Voon, supra note 3 at 221; 
James N Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) at 6; Ferguson & Mansbach, supra note 2 at 2; Emeka 
Duruigbo, “Corporate Accountability and Liability for International Human Rights Abuses: 
Recent Changes and Recurring Challenges” (2008) 6:2 Nw U J Int’l Hum Rts 222 at 224; 
Johns, supra note 3 at 893; Olga Martin-Ortega, “Business and Human Rights in Conflict” 
(2008) 22:3 Ethics & Int’l Aff 273 at 274 [Olga Martin-Ortega, “Business”]; Pini Pavel 
Miretski, “The Influence of Non-Governmental Actors on Compliance with International 
Law – Compliance with United Nations Security Council Decisions on Angola’s Conflict 
Diamonds” in Noëlle Quénivet & Shilan Shah-Davis, eds, International Law and Armed 
Conflict: Challenges in the 21st Century (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2010) 208 at 208-10. 
4. See e.g. Barbara Townley, “Foucault, Power/Knowledge, and Its Relevance for Human 
Resource Management” (1993) 18:3 Ac Mgmt Rev 518 at 521-23. For a discussion 
of Foucault’s work in the context of international law, see James F Keeley, “Toward a 
Foucauldian Analysis of International Regimes” (1990) 44:1 Int’l Org 83 at 84-85.
5. This project has later been renamed the “camera distribution project,” and the two names will 
be used interchangeably throughout this article.
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to present the entire complexity of Foucault’s work on power/knowledge,6 but 
rather to apply his notion of resistance to the increased ability of NGOs in a 
transnational society to acquire power through the spread of knowledge. The 
focus of this article is on the mechanisms of power rather than on the definition 
of power.7 In an information-driven world, power relations “are multiform 
and are not found in a dichotomous relationship between the dominator and 
dominated.”8 Knowledge provided by transnational actors such as NGOs and 
TNCs to the news media (which influences and, to a large degree, controls the 
flow of knowledge in transnational society)9 may influence the manifestation and 
experience of power, and can even assist in conflict resolution. This fact in turn 
empowers transnational actors, as they are able to have an impact on the array of 
available knowledge in the system.10 
6. This article focuses on the genealogical period of Foucault, and in light of its limited scope, 
it does not include an analysis of Foucault’s work on the subject of governmentality. For 
an introduction to Foucault’s genealogical period and to his work on governmentality, 
see e.g. David Knights, “Writing Organizational Analysis into Foucault” (2002) 9:4 Org 
575 at 578; Gibson Burrell, “Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: 
The Contribution of Michel Foucault” in Alan McKinlay & Ken Starkey, eds, Foucault, 
Management and Organization Theory: From Panopticon to Technologies of Self (London, UK: 
SAGE, 1998) 14; Arnold Davidson, “Ethics as Ascetics: Foucault, the History of Ethics, and 
Ancient Thought” in Gary Gutting, ed, The Cambridge Companion to Foucault (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 115 at 118. 
7. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed by 
Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon et al (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) at 51 
[Foucault, Power/knowledge].
8. Leonard M Hammer, A Foucauldian Approach to International Law: Descriptive Thoughts for 
Normative Issues (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007) at 46.
9. See Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?” (1999) 
25:2 Rev Int’l Stud 301 at 301 [Robinson, “The CNN Effect”]; Piers Robinson, The CNN 
Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention (London: Routledge, 2002) at 1-2 
[Robinson, The Myth of News]; Clifford Bob, “Merchants of Morality” (2002) 129:2 Foreign 
Pol’y 36 at 38.
10. See e.g. Tanja A Börzel, Tobias Hofmann & Carina Sprungk, “Why Do States not Obey 
the Law? Lessons from the European Union” (Paper delivered at the EUSA Conference, 
Nashville, 27-30 March 2003) [unpublished] at 15-16; Jonas Tallberg, “Paths to 
Compliance: Enforcement, Management, and the European Union” (2002) 56:3 Int’l Org 
609; David A Lake & Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach” 
in DA Lake & R Powell, eds, Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999) 3 at 38. One must note, however, that unlike the 
Foucauldian approach these theories see knowledge and power as analytically distinct 
terminuses. The use of conclusions from these approaches to enrich the conclusions of the 
Foucauldian approach should therefore be done carefully. 
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Jeremy Bentham stated that the two main principles of power are that it 
should be visible and unverifiable.11 However, one may ponder whether these 
principles can be applied to the concept of power in the international arena. In 
today’s global world, the number of publicly available sources of information and 
knowledge is constantly increasing due to widely available technological develop-
ments in the communications sector.12 This spread of technology may, however, 
at times, make it necessary for states to limit public access to information in order 
to restrict the overall visibility of their own actions.13 Alternatively, states might 
opt to pursue their own ways of providing information as part of a counter-
information campaign.14 Still, even where one might expect that a state would 
have total control over the flow of information, as in the context of combat 
during armed conflict, a (democratic) state’s ability to reduce the visibility and 
subsequent exposure of its actions, including its military actions, is becoming 
increasingly constrained in today’s globalized and transnational society. The 
presence of global NGOs such as Human Rights Watch or Amnesty Interna-
tional, even in the most remote parts of the world, combined with the availability 
of cheap and easily attainable means of communication provided by media and 
technology TNCs, creates the above-mentioned visibility effect. The increasing 
spread of technology accessible to the individual end-user, such as cell phones 
and Internet access, enables individual participants to broadcast their point of 
view to a wide global audience. 
11. Jeremy Bentham, Panopticon; or, the Inspection-House, vol 1 (Dublin: Payne, 1791) at 23-27; 
Foucault, Discipline, supra note 1 at 201.
12. While Bentham’s work produced many valuable insights and laid many important 
foundations for various fields, including international law, this article is limited to Bentham’s 
principles of panopticon which are interpreted mainly in line with Foucault’s work.
13. See e.g. Elana J Zeide, “In Bed with the Military: First Amendment Implications of 
Embedded Journalism” (2005) 80:4 NYUL Rev 1309 at 1310; Foreign Press Association 
v GOC Southern Command, Major-general Yoav Galant (2008), 9910/08 (Israel HC) 
(in Hebrew); Rory McCarthy, “Foreign journalists demand Gaza access,” The Guardian 
(30 December 2008) online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/30/
israel-gaza-journalists/print>.
14. See e.g. Matthew Kalman & Noah Smith, “Israeli army launches camera combat unit 
– video,” The Guardian (23 January 2014) online: <http://www.theguardian.com/
world/video/2014/jan/23/israeli-army-combat-cameras-unit-video>; The Associated 
Press, “IDF soldiers may take cameras to war to stave off international criticism,” 
Haaretz (11 April 2011) online: <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/
idf-soldiers-may-take-cameras-to-war-to-stave-off-international-criticism-1.355390>.
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The second principle of power, un-verifiability, is implemented and 
demonstrated by B’Tselem’s Shooting Back project.15 In January 2007, B’Tselem 
provided Palestinians living in high-conflict areas with video cameras in order 
to capture, expose, and seek redress for human rights violations in the OT. This 
project, once publicized, increased the awareness of soldiers and, more signifi-
cantly, their commanders of the possibility of being monitored and filmed 
without always knowing the exact source of the filming. This awareness increased 
the self-discipline of soldiers and commanders alike. The videos even assisted the 
internal disciplinary and judicial mechanisms of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) 
in investigating potential violations when suspicions surfaced.
This article postulates that transnational non-state actors can influence 
the considerations of state decision-makers in the context of compliance with 
international law and can potentially play a wider role within the enforcement 
structure of international law. The latter role of non-state actors may involve 
monitoring and revealing the identities of violators of said rules by way of 
naming and shaming. If the basic condition of the international legal system 
is anarchy, characterized by the absence of a supreme law maker, a top-down 
hierarchy of laws, or a structured enforcement mechanism,16 the latter character-
istic at least may slowly be changing as the global political arena develops from an 
international system to a transnational society. The recognition and inclusion of 
transnational non-state actors in the enforcement of international law may be a 
building block in remedying the general enforcement deficit of international law. 
15. For positive responses to the Shooting Back project, see Yuval Azoulay, “B’Tselem cameras 
pay off for victims of settler attacks,” Haaretz (17 June 2008) online: <http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages/993346.html>; Interview of Oren Yakobovich by Amy Goodman [nd] 
in “Shooting Back: The Israeli Human Rights Group B’Tselem Gives Palestinians Video 
Cameras to Document Life Under Occupation,” Democracy Now! (26 December 2007) 
online: <http://www.democracynow.org/2007/12/26/shooting_back_the_israeli_human_
rights> [Yakobovich interview]. But see Gerald M Steinberg, “Bad Timing: B’Tselem And 
The Durban Conference,” The Jewish Week (30 December 2008) online: <https://faculty.biu.
ac.il/~steing/oped%20PDFs/2008/badtiming.pdf>.
16. The term “anarchy” refers here to a lack of centralized government, and not to a lack of 
order. The term is characteristically used in international relations scholarship to describe 
a system with order and rules despite the lack of a supreme sovereign. For an introduction 
to the concept of anarchy as used in international relations scholarship, see Helen Milner, 
“The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” (1991) 17:1 
Rev Int’l Stud 67 at 69-71; Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is what States Make of It: The 
Social Construction of Power Politics” (1992) 46:2 Int’l Org 391 at 391. On enforcement 
under the conditions of anarchy, see Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: 
Rinehart & Company, 1952) at 18-19; Thomas M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among 
Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990) at 3-16.
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Non-state actors may increase compliance with international legal rules by means 
of additional compliance incentives such as naming and shaming, surveillance, 
publicity, and visibility. 
This article introduces B’Tselem’s camera distribution project within a 
discussion of the concepts of power, power/knowledge, and panopticism drawn 
from Foucault’s conceptual framework and its implementation in organizational 
studies. Within this context, this article uses the example of the Israeli Shooting 
Back project to explore the role of transnational actors in testing and applying the 
panoptic structure of international.
I. THE SHOOTING BACK PROJECT
B’Tselem is an Israeli NGO focusing on the collection, analysis, and provision 
of information about human rights in the OT, in order to educate the (first and 
foremost, Israeli) public and policy makers. While B’Tselem is primarily an Israeli 
NGO, it has several characteristics making it, in fact, a transnational organization 
as well. First, while focusing on the Israeli public and policy makers, B’Tselem is 
also an actor in the transnational arena, making information available to all those 
interested. US foreign policy plays a vital role in shaping Israel’s policies in the 
OT, and B’Tselem has an office in Washington, DC.17 Furthermore, a significant 
part of its funding comes from Europe and North America.18 
In January 2007, B’Tselem launched its camera distribution project as 
a video advocacy project focusing on the OT.19 It provided video cameras to 
Palestinians living in high-conflict areas. One of the core strategies of the project 
was distributing cameras to “passive” civilians rather than known activists, as part 
of a passive image-making concept.20 The goal of the project, as stated on the 
website of the organization, was: “bringing the reality of [Palestinians’] lives under 
occupation to the attention of the Israeli and international public, exposing and 
seeking redress for violations of human rights.”21 Three factors caused B’Tselem 
to initiate the project: frustration about B’Tselem’s inability, due to limited 
resources, to document the violations it was aware of; the desire to enlarge the 
17. B’Tselem USA, online: <http://www.btselem.org/usa>.
18. About B’Tselem, online: <http://www.btselem.org/about_btselem>.
19. B’Tselem’s Camera Project, online: <http://www.btselem.org/english/Video/CDP_
Background.asp> [B’Tselem Camera Project].
20. Interview of Yoav Gross, coordinator of the B’Tselem video department, by the authors (29 
November 2009) [Gross interview].
21. “Ruin and Humiliation – Qalqilya, 2007,” online: <http://www.btselem.org/video/2007/08/
ruin-and-humiliation-qalqilya>.
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audience aware of the violations; and the wish to promote law enforcement.22 As 
of November 2009, B’Tselem provided more than 150 cameras to individuals 
and families living in the West Bank and Gaza, focusing, in particular, on the 
region of Hebron and the South Hills.23 
The project was managed by B’Tselem’s video department. This department 
was originally established to provide information on the activities of the organi-
zation to the public and to advocate for B’Tselem’s activities in the news media. 
Later, and partly due to the success of the Shooting Back project, the video 
department began focusing more on supplying information which could later 
be used as evidence in investigations conducted by enforcement authorities and 
in judicial proceedings.24 Yoav Gross and Oren Yakobovich of B’Tselem’s video 
department emphasized in interviews that every time B’Tselem submitted a 
report to the IDF it received a quick response, which was consequently published 
by B’Tselem, along with the report. Gross also pointed out that both the army 
and the police encouraged the organization to film the violations witnessed.25 
Gross noted that once the project was well established, military and police intelli-
gence offices often contacted him directly, as soon as there were rumors of an 
incident in the OT, inquiring whether B’Tselem possessed video documentation 
of the rumored incident.26 In June 2009, the Shooting Back project received the 
British One World Media Award in the field of citizen journalism.27 
One of the most publicized incidents documented as a result of the project 
was captured by the first video received by B’Tselem. In this video, sixteen-
year-old Rajah Abu Aisha of Hebron recorded a female Jewish neighbour, Yifat 
Alkobi, coming up to Abu Aicha’s front gate, telling his family to close the door 
and stay inside, and repeatedly calling a member of his family a slut, all with no 
response from a soldier who was standing nearby.28 However, probably the most 
famous incident documented by the project was the case of Ashraf Abu Rahma, 
22. Gross interview, supra note 20.
23. Marie Medina, “Shooting Back in Palestine: when cameras become weapons,” Babelmed (21 
November 2008) online: <http://www.babelmed.net/Countries/Mediterranean/shooting_
back.php?c=3757&m=9&l=en>; Y Azoulay, supra note 15; Gross interview, supra note 20.
24. Gross interview, supra note 20.
25. Ibid; Yakobovich interview, supra note 15.
26. Gross interview, supra note 20.
27. B’Tselem, Press Release, “B’Tselem’s video camera distribution project wins British One 
World Media award” (23 June 2009) online: <http://www.btselem.org/english/press_
releases/20090623.asp>.
28. Y Azoulay, supra note 15; Yakobovich interview, supra note 15; Gross interview, supra note 20.
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a Palestinian protesting the separation barrier in Ni’lin.29 Abu Rahma was 
arrested during a routine demonstration on 7 July 2008. After being handcuffed, 
blindfolded, beaten, and left on the ground for two hours, he was led by the arm 
by Lieutenant Colonel Omri Borberg and ordered to remain standing next to a 
military jeep. Orna Ben-Naftali and Noam Zamir describe what happened next: 
Speaking in Hebrew, the officer asked [a] soldier, “What do you say, shall we take 
him aside and ‘shoot rubber’ at him?” The soldier responded, also in Hebrew: “I 
have no problem shooting at him.” The officer then instructed the soldier to load the 
bullet and the soldier responded that he had already done so. The soldier then aimed 
his weapon at the protester’s legs and fired a rubber-coated steel bullet, a shrapnel of 
which hit Abu Rahma’s left toe.30
This incident was filmed by a Palestinian girl, Salaam Amira, from the 
window of her home.31 According to Gross, the value of this footage was not 
immediately comprehended. A copy of the tape was transferred to International 
Solidarity volunteers, and was later given to Al Jazeera, which dismissed the value 
of broadcasting it.32 The footage was published by B’Tselem on 20 July 2008, a 
day after it received the copy of the video and thoroughly checked its facts and 
authenticity.33 Following the video’s publication, B’Tselem presented the 
29. Orna Ben-Naftali & Noam Zamir, “Whose ‘Conduct Unbecoming’?: The Shooting of a 
Handcuffed, Blindfolded Palestinian Demonstrator” (2009) 7:1 J Int’l Crim Justice 155; 
Peter Beaumont, “Story behind the shot protester and the teen who caught it on film,” 
The Guardian (27 July 2008) online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/27/
israelandthepalestinians.middleeast> [Beaumont, “Story”]; Peter Beaumont, “Israeli 
occupation filmed by 100 Palestinian cameras” The Guardian (30 July 2008) (video), online: 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2008/jul/30/beaumont.palestine> [Beaumont, 
“Israeli”]; Abu Rahma v Military Advocate General (2009), HCJ 7195/08 at para 3 (Israel SC) 
[Abu Rahma].
30. Supra note 29. For further descriptions of the incident, see Abu Rahma, supra note 29 at 
para 3; Military Advocate General v Lieutenant Colonel Omri Borberg and Sergeant First Class 
Leonardo Korea (Verdict) (2010), M/08/5 at 45-46 (Israel SC) (in Hebrew), online: <http://
www.btselem.org/Hebrew/Legal_Documents/20100715_Nilin_verdict_heb.pdf> [Borberg & 
Korea Verdict].
31. Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 29 at 158. For a different account of the facts in this 
incident, see Beaumont, “Story,” supra note 29; Beaumont, “Israeli,” supra note 29.
32. Gross interview, supra note 20.
33. Soon after the video was released, in a demonstration against the separation barrier in Ni’lin, 
the father of Salaam Amira was arrested and charged with violation of an enclosed military 
space, participation in a protest, and assault of a soldier. However, the Judea and Samaria 
Military Court of Appeals released him due to a lack of evidence. See Ben-Naftali & Zamir, 
supra note 29 at 158, n 11; Dan Izenberg, “Military court orders release of Ni’lin video 
whistleblower’s father,” The Jerusalem Post (19 August 2008) (on file with author). As Waked 
discusses, the judge suggested the questionability of the charges by asking: “Why was the 
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information to military police34 and demanded that an investigation be opened 
in order to bring the officer and the soldier involved in the incident to justice. 
Following the investigation, the Military Advocate General (MAG) decided to 
prosecute both the officer and the soldier for “conduct unbecoming,” a minor 
offence leaving no criminal record. According to the indictment, the officer 
intended to threaten the detainee, while the soldier misunderstood his intentions.35 
On 19 August 2008 an urgent appeal of the MAG’s decision was filed with the 
Israeli High Court of Justice (HCJ), which issued an interim injunction deferring 
the proceedings. In September, following a hearing of the case, the High Court 
ordered the MAG to reconsider the indictment and to inform the HCJ of his 
decision. The High Court also used the occasion to criticize the MAG’s judgment 
in this case.36 After the MAG again decided to indict simply for conduct 
unbecoming,37 the HCJ issued a judgment on 1 July 2009 in which it overturned 
the MAG’s decision. (Justice Rubinstein even called it blasphemy.) Furthermore, 
the HCJ requested that both the soldier and the officer be indicted for more 
serious offences.38 The subsequent trial began in September 2009, with Lieutenant 
Colonel Borberg being charged with conduct unbecoming and making threats, 
while First Sergeant Korea was charged with both conduct unbecoming and 
illegal use of firearms.39 On 15 July 2010 both Lieutenant Colonel Borberg and 
First Sergeant Korea were found guilty as charged.40 However, despite the clear 
denunciations used in the verdict to describe the incident and the defendants’ 
father of the girl arrested out of all those protesting at the time?” See Ali Waked, “Military 
judge: Naalin arrest unfounded,” Ynet (17 August 2008) online: <http://www.ynetnews.
com/articles/0,7340,L-3583912,00.html>. See also Gross interview, supra note 20; Hasin Ali 
Amira v Military Prosecution (2008), AM/08/3938 (Military Court of Appeals) (in Hebrew). 
34. Gross interview, supra note 20.
35. Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 29 at 158; Abu Rahma, supra note 29 at paras 15, 24, 28; 
Borberg & Korea Verdict, supra note 30 at 4-5.
36. Abu Rahma, supra note 29 at paras 2, 34, 53, 65, 71-81; Ben-Naftali & Zamir, supra note 29 
at 159.
37. Ibid; “Judge Advocate General informs the High Court that he will not amend the 
indictment in the shooting of a bound Palestinian in Ni’lin” B’Tselem (21 November 2009), 
online: <http://www.btselem.org/english/firearms/20081104_nilin_state_response.asp>.
38. Abu Rahma, supra note 29 at para 88.
39. IDF Mag Corps, “Opening of the trial of the accused in Ni’lin shooting affair,” (24 
September 2009) (in Hebrew); Anshel Pfeffer, “Prosecution: Lt. Colonel Borberg did not 
give an order to shoot a rubber bullet at a bound demonstrator at Ni’lin,” Haaretz (25 
September 2009) (in Hebrew), online: <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?it
emNo=1116799&contrassID=0&subContrassID=9>.
40. Borberg & Korea Verdict, supra note 30. 
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behaviour, as well as the special attention given to the damage the incident caused 
to Israel’s public image, both defendants received moderate sentences.41 
This case, as well as a number of others, including the case of Yifat Alkobi, 
emphasize one significant effect of the camera distribution project: visibility 
that leads subsequently to the exposure of potential offences committed by the 
military under the veil of state security. The presence of cameras in high-conflict 
areas presents a new dimension of visibility not known before. Yakobovich, then 
the director of B’Tselem’s video department, focused on power and transparency 
when he described the Shooting Back project to Democracy Now’s Amy Goodman: 
It’s giving power. You know, this word is called ‘empowerment.’ I don’t like this 
word so much, but I will use it. It’s the children and the kids [who] are filming. It’s 
helping to mobilize communities. In Hebron, where the community was destroyed, 
suddenly they’re filming and they have some kind of an interest in seeing the videos, 
talking about it. And what I hope to achieve, that everything is going to be filmed, 
at least [that] ... there’s going to be a feeling that everything is being filmed, nothing 
is being done in the dark. And this is what B’Tselem was basically established for, to 
bring light to places that are in the dark so violation will not occur.42
II. POWER, KNOWLEDGE, AND THE STRUCTURE OF A 
PANOPTICON
In order to understand the role of non-state actors in the power/knowledge 
structure of international law, it is helpful first to discuss briefly the concept of 
power and the related power/knowledge structure. Foucault’s analysis of power 
was not intended to define power but only to suggest where we should find it. 
Therefore, instead of using a single definition of power, we can but elaborate on 
some of its characteristics.43 This analysis will be based on Foucault’s later, so-called 
genealogical period.44 The issues explored by Foucault during this period included 
41. Elior Levy, “Palestinians slam Borberg sentence,” Ynet (27 January 2011) online: <http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4020125,00.html>; Ori Lewis, “No Jail for Israel 
Soldiers who Shot Palestinian,” Reuters (27 January 2011) online: <http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/01/27/us-palestinians-israel-sentences-idUSTRE70Q6CT20110127>; Military 
Advocate General v Lieutenant Colonel Omri Borberg and Sergeant First Class Leonardo Korea 
(Sentencing) (2011), M/08/5 2011 (COURT) (in Hebrew) [Borberg & Korea Sentencing].
42. Yakobovich interview, supra note 15 [emphasis added].
43. Thomas E Wartenberg, Rethinking Power (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992) at xxi-xxii.
44. Alan McKinlay & Ken Starkey, “Managing Foucault: Foucault, Management and 
Organization Theory” in McKinlay & Starkey, eds, supra note 6, 1 at 1; Knights, supra note 6 
at 578; Burrell, supra note 6 at 17–21.
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the relationship between power and knowledge “and the ‘genealogy’ of ‘organiza-
tions (as) social machines which produce elaborate discourses of information/
knowledge in which human subjects are a necessary part of the material flow on 
which the discourses are inscribed.’”45
A. THE CONCEPT OF POWER AND POWER/KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO 
FOUCAULT
Power for Foucault is not a unitary concept, but “an infinitely complex network 
of ‘micro-powers’” and power relations that permeate every aspect of social 
life.46 It is not localized in a single place, nor can it be acquired as wealth or a 
commodity.47 Power does not have a subject.48 Its objects are data, information, 
and the power to evaluate information.49 Power is not static, rather it and its 
application are subject to constant change and alteration.50 As Leonard Hammer 
writes: “Power is part of an ongoing and ever-changing relationship of resistance 
to the assertion of power.”51 It is not vested only in the state, “but rather [it is] an 
ongoing form of relationship between various social forces and actors that tend to 
influence and shape state decisions.”52 Foucault said in one of his lectures: “Power 
is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those 
networks; they are in a position to both submit to and exercise this power.”53 
B’Tselem’s Shooting Back project exemplifies the dynamics of power and 
resistance through which the use of technology and knowledge can, at times, 
enable a traditionally “inferior” actor—in this case, an occupied population—to 
overcome a far superior actor—in this case, an established occupying power. 
45. McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 44 at 1, citing Robert Cooper & Gibson Burrell, 
“Modernism, Postmodernism and Organizational Analysis: An Introduction” (1988) 9:1 Org 
Stud 91 at 105. 
46. Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth (New York: Tavistock Publications, 1980) 
at 139, 183. See also Stewart Clegg, “Foucault, Power and Organizations” in McKinlay & 
Starkey, eds, supra note 6, 29 at 31.
47. Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76, 
translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 2003) at 29 [Foucault, Society]; Sheridan, 
supra note 46 at 184.
48. Wartenberg, supra note 43 at xxii.
49. Larry Catá Backer, “Global Panopticism: States, Corporations, and the Governance Effects of 
Monitoring Regimes” (2008) 15:1 Ind J Global Legal Stud 101 at 128.
50. Hammer, supra note 8 at 42.
51. Ibid at 47.
52. Ibid at 44.
53. Foucault, Society, supra note 47 at 29.
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For Foucault, power and knowledge are inseparable:54 the exercise of power 
perpetually creates knowledge, and, conversely, knowledge constantly brings 
about effects of power. Knowledge and power are mixed with one another, 
and it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, just as it 
is impossible for knowledge not to give rise to power.55 Truth and knowledge 
are in fact “weapons by which a society manages itself.”56 B’Tselem’s Shooting 
Back project provides an example of knowledge allowing a civil population to 
defend itself against the possibility of violations of the law of occupation by the 
occupying power, as we will argue below in Part II(B), below, in relation to the 
Abu Rahma case. 
Data are inert prior to being used.57 However, the use of data creates 
knowledge, which is the exercise of power.58 As Stuart Hall writes, “Foucault 
argued that not only is knowledge always a form of power, but power is implicated 
in the questions of whether and under what circumstances knowledge is to be 
applied… .”59 As others exercise power, one’s knowledge changes, which, in turn, 
influences one’s own use of power.60 While we acknowledge that the knowledge 
of human rights violations gained within the scope of B’Tselem’s Shooting 
Back project will not always lead to actual enforcement action (contrary to the 
above-mentioned case of Abu Rahma), we contend that it may contribute to the 
existing general knowledge of such human rights violations, and hence to the 
exercise of power.
54. This is mainly true in regard to his later works, while in the early ones, one can find a 
different interpretation. See Townley, supra note 4 at 521.
55. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 51-52; Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0: Beyond Power 
and Knowledge (New York: Other Press, 2006) at 113; Sheridan, supra note 46 at 138-40; 
Townley, supra note 4 at 521. See also Sheridan, supra note 46 at 131. Sheridan quotes 
Foucault as stating, 
No body of knowledge can be formed without a system of communications, records, accumu-
lation and displacement, which is in itself a form of power and which is linked, in its existence 
and functioning, to the other forms of power. Conversely, no power can be exercised without 
the extraction, appropriation, distribution or retention of knowledge. On this level, there is 
not knowledge on the one side and society on the other, or science and the state, but only the 
fundamental forms of knowledge/power … .
56. McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 44 at 1.
57. Backer, supra note 49 at 126.
58. Sheridan, supra note 46 at 220.
59. “The Work of Representation” in Stuart Hall, ed, Representation: Cultural Representations and 
Signifying Practices (London, UK: Sage, Open University, 1997) 13 at 48. 
60. Hammer, supra note 8 at 46.
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B. PANOPTICISM
The ensemble of mechanisms brought into play in different clusters of power is 
perhaps best seen in the panopticon.61 The principle of the panopticon is: 
A perimeter building in the form of a ring. At the centre of this [structure], a tower, 
pierced by large windows opening on to the inner face of the ring. The outer build-
ing is divided into cells each of which traverses the whole thickness of the building. 
These cells have two windows, one opening on to the inside, facing the windows of 
the central tower, the other, outer one allowing daylight to pass through the whole 
cell. All that is then needed is to put an overseer in the tower and place in each of 
the cells a lunatic, a patient, a convict, a worker or a schoolboy. The back lighting 
enables one to pick out from the central tower the little captive silhouettes in the 
ring of the cells. In short, the principle of the dungeon is reversed; daylight and the 
overseer’s gazer capture the inmate more effectively than darkness, which afforded 
after all a sort of protection.62
Bentham’s concept of panopticism is arguably the “Columbus’s egg in the 
order of politics,” as Bentham himself defined it.63 Panopticism is “a techno-
logical invention in the order of power, comparable with the steam engine in 
the order of production… ,”64 as it automates and dis-individualizes power.65 
Power in the panopticon does not depend solely on an individual person, but 
rather is “a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, [and] gazes 
… [which] produce the relations in which individuals are caught up.”66 The 
panopticon is a machine that produces the homogenous effects of power—
both the “inspector” and the inmates in the “cells” are constantly watched. 
Bentham emphasized the importance of seeing without being seen for the 
inspectors and the overall safeguard of equal treatment of the inmates as a 
consequence of this visibility.67 
Bentham wrote about four somewhat different types of panopticons.68 However, 
in this article, we will focus only on the first version of the “prison-panopticon” 
61. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 71. For a discussion of the panopticon, see 
generally Bentham, supra note 11. 
62. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 147. See also Bentham, supra note 11 at 5-12.
63. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 146. See also Bentham, supra note 11 at 139.
64. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 71.
65. Foucault, Discipline, supra note 1 at 202.
66. Ibid; Clegg, supra note 46 at 35.
67. Bentham, supra note 11 at 23, 29-30.
68. Anne Brunon-Ernst, “Deconstructing Panopticism into the Plural Panopticons” in Anne 
Brunon-Ernst, ed, Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives on Bentham’s Panopticon (Farnham, UK: 
Ashgate, 2012) 17 at 21-24.
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and Foucault’s interpretation thereof through the concept of panopticism.69 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault wrote that the panopticon was “a machine for 
dissociating the see/being seen dyad: in the peripheral ring, one is totally seen, 
without ever seeing; in the central tower, one sees everything without ever being 
seen.”70 However, in later interviews he stressed that the overseer also cannot 
escape from the structure of the panopticon.71 As Foucault himself said: “In the 
Panopticon each person, depending on his place, is watched by all or certain of 
the others.”72 This power to watch is not identified as resting with an individual 
who possesses or exercises such power by right of birth; rather, this power has 
become a machine that no one owns.73
Bentham’s idea of the panopticon was originally constructed to create 
an instrument of discipline enabling the ruler to perfect his control over the 
dominated. Foucault’s perception of this machine in the context of power/
knowledge and his emphasis on the mutual visibility of both the “guard” and 
the “inmates” emphasized the fact that the control was exercised from within the 
social body and not from “the monarch” above. In Foucault’s later writings, he 
shifted his emphasis to stressing that “where there is power, there is resistance.”74 
No single individual is in total control in the panopticon as even the “inmates” 
have a role in the control over the “guard.”75 The power of the “inmates” arises 
from the knowledge they possess as a result of the visibility of the “guard.” It is 
this awareness of his visibility that limits the total control of the “guard” and 
hence subverts and limits his own power. This is not to contend that the power 
of the “inmates” is equal or even comparable to that of the “guard,” but rather 
to point out that they possess certain, though limited, power as a result of the 
structure of the panopticon. 
The power of an occupied population against the occupying power functions 
in much the same way: video cameras and surveillance equipment enable the 
69. See Leroy’s analysis on the relevance of Foucault’s interpretation to other versions of 
panopticism. Marie-Laure Leroy, “Transparency and Politics: The Reversed Panopticon as a 
Response to Abuse of Power” in Anne Brunon-Ernst, ed, Beyond Foucault: New Perspectives 
on Bentham’s Panopticon (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2012) 143. But see criticism of Foucault’s 
approach and its effect on Bentham’s legacy in Anne Brunon-Ernst, “Introduction” in ibid, 1 
at 2-3.
70. Foucault, Discipline, supra note 1 at 201-02.
71. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 156.
72. Ibid at 158.
73. Ibid at 156.
74. Keith Douglas Smith, Liberalism, Surveillances and Resistance: Indigenous Communities in 
Western Canada, 1877-1927 (Edmonton, Alta: Athabasca University Press, 2009) at 6. 
75. Ibid at 5-6.
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occupied population to create spreadable knowledge of violations, the potential 
negative effect of which limits the total control of the occupying power. In order 
to provide credibility to the potential threat of the knowledge of the “inmates” 
within the panopticon structure, there is still a need for a responsible external 
power (similar to the Israeli legal system’s eventual indictment of the defendants in 
the Abu Rahma case); but in a world where “panoptic” structures are everywhere, 
the very potential of visibility often suffices.
The major effect of the panopticon is 
to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the 
automatic functioning of power. …In view of this, Bentham laid down the principle 
that power should be visible and unverifiable. Visible: the inmate will constantly 
have before his eyes the tall outline of the central tower from which he is spied upon. 
Unverifiable: the inmate must never know whether he is being looked at at any one 
moment, but he must be sure that he may always be so.76
The invention of the panopticon had the peculiarity of being utilized first 
of all on a local level, in schools, barracks, and hospitals. However, for Bentham, 
panopticism was a set of principles applicable to all forms of social governance.77 
As Foucault wrote: “This was where the experiment of integral surveillance was 
carried out.”78 Surveillance in its modern form represents yet another step in the 
perfection of social panopticism. The creation of systems of social order that are 
self-regulating and internalized by those regulated represents a further shifting of 
coercive power from the hierarchical and external (the state, the police, and the 
institution) to the social and internal (the individual and the private members of 
society).79 The effect of the panopticon over time is that the threat of constant 
observation leads to internalization and reduces the need for formal discipline 
so that, finally, “discipline, regulation and surveillance are taken for granted.”80
This process of internalization leads us to claim that the “guards’” mere 
awareness of the potential for exposure and the “inmates’” knowledge of any 
transgressions increase the power of the “inmates.” Therefore, the mere awareness 
of the possibility of being videotaped by B’Tselem’s cameras spurs soldiers and 
their commanders to self-regulate and discipline themselves in order to prevent 
76. Foucault, Discipline, supra note 1 at 201. See also Clegg, supra note 46 at 35; Derrick Jensen 
& George Draffan, Welcome to the Machine: Science, Surveillance, and the Culture of Control 
(White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004) at 10.
77. Bentham, supra note 11 at 2-3; McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 44 at 3.
78. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 71.
79. Backer, supra note 49 at 112; Smith, supra note 74 at 5.
80. McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 44 at 2, citing Shoshana Zuboff, In the Age of the Smart 
Machine: The Future of Work and Power (New York: Basic Books, 1988) at 319.
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the creation (and mainly publication) of new negative images similar to the 
ones that formed the basis of the Abu Rahma incident. The added credibility 
of the project, due to the actual indictments of the filmed soldiers, increases the 
probability of potential penalties and further discipline and, in turn, reinforces 
the internalization of the very ideas of discipline by the individuals.
In organizational studies, these effects of the panopticon are connected 
with the principle of “continuous observation made possible by technical 
arrangements,” where the system essentially makes the individual “want” what 
the system needs to perform well.81 As Stewart Clegg notes, since Max Weber, 
“obedience” has been central to the analysis of the production of power in organi-
zations.82 The lessons of the panopticon are also learned and implemented when 
constructing and managing organizations and factories.83 B’Tselem’s Shooting 
Back project tries to utilize these effects in order to minimize the occurrence of 
Israeli violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) in the OT by revealing 
them to the Israeli and international public.84
III. THE ROLE OF TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS AS PART OF AN 
ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE
According to Foucault, Joseph Michel Antoine Servan wrote: 
When you have thus formed the chain of ideas in the heads of your citizens, you 
will then be able to pride yourselves on guiding them and being their masters. A 
stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains; but a true politician binds 
them even more strongly by the chains of their own ideas; it is at the stable point of 
reason that he secures the end of the chain; this link is at all the stronger in that we 
do not know of what it is made and we believe it to be our own work; despair and 
time eat away the bonds of iron and steel, but they are powerless against the habitual 
union of ideas, they can only tighten it still more; and on the soft fibres of the brain 
is founded the unshakable base of the soundest of Empires.85
81. McKinlay & Starkey, supra note 44 at 3, citing Zuboff, supra note 80 at 322.
82. Clegg, supra note 46 at 38.
83. Alan McKinlay & Phil Taylor, “Through the Looking Glass: Foucault and the Politics of 
Production” in McKinlay & Starkey, eds, supra note 6, 173 at 177. See generally Alan 
McKinlay & Ken Starkey, eds, supra note 6.
84. B’Tselem Camera Project, supra note 19.
85. Foucault, Discipline, supra note 1 at 103, citing Joseph Michel Antoine Servan, Le soldat 
citoyen, ou vues patriotiques sur la maniere la plus avantageuse de pourvoir a la défense du 
royaume (Neufchâtel, France: Dans le pays de la liberté, 1780); Joseph Michel Antoine 
Servan, Discours sur l’administration de la justice criminelle, (Yverdon, France: Fortunato 
Bartolomeo De Felice, 1767).
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In order to assess whether transnational actors such as B’Tselem can play an 
active role in enforcing compliance with international law, we have to revisit the 
tenets of power and its enforcement. Thomas M. Franck defined legitimacy as 
“a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward 
compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that 
the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of right process.”86 Legitimacy is a component of 
power, since it enables one to achieve its goals by means other than coercion 
alone. It is a significant cost-effective measure as it “has the power to pull toward 
compliance those who cannot be compelled.”87 
Foucault said that power cannot be held for long by purely repressive 
measures. Perhaps one of the mechanisms to overcome this repression is 
legitimacy. Legitimacy lies at the basis of the pull towards compliance: “it is the 
legitimacy of the rules which conduces to their being respected.”88 One should, 
however, be careful not to mistake legitimacy for a neutral concept. The question 
of what is legitimate is resolved by power struggles.89 Legitimacy may derive from 
ideology or from local socioeconomic or political interests that bring a certain 
conception of morals and ethics to a given society.90 
The presence of media giants and NGOs limits the freedom of states to 
use military means as they may see fit. The quest for legitimacy, which can be 
fulfilled by complying with international law,91 affects the assertion of power by 
the state. Power is the response to the assertion of power by others.92 Therefore, 
by revealing new issues and hence changing available knowledge, transnational 
actors restrain and reconstruct the power of states.
Ronnie D. Lipschutz argues that NGOs redefine the borders between 
public and private spheres.93 In many campaigns organized by NGOs, issues 
86. Supra note 16 at 24.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid at 38.
89. On the concepts of “legitimate power” and “illegitimate power” in organizational theories, 
see Clegg, supra note 46 at 38.
90. Pitman B Potter, “Legal Reform in China: Institutions, Culture, and Selective Adaptation” 
(2004) 29:2 L & Soc Inquiry 465 at 479; Pitman B Potter, “Globalization and Economic 
Regulation in China: Selective Adaptation of Globalized Norms and Practices” (2003) 2:1 
Wash U Global Stud L Rev 119 at 121.
91. Kenneth W Abbott & Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance” 
(2000) 54:3 Int’l Org 421 at 428.
92. Hammer, supra note 8 at 47.
93. “Power, Politics and Global Civil Society” (2005) 33:3 Millennium: J Int’l Stud 747 at 
759-60.
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that were once considered private are becoming part of public debate, and 
matters that were previously regarded as objects for public influence are urged 
to be left in the private sphere. B’Tselem’s camera distribution project presents a 
case where publicized knowledge of a situation empowers the weak, in this case, 
the occupied civil population.94 This knowledge is power, as it empowers the 
civilians and restrains the power of the occupying state. The state, and particu-
larly its armed forces, has to reconsider its actions, as violations of the law of 
occupation are no longer regarded as the state’s private domain, outside the remit 
of domestic and international scrutiny. With the infrastructure present in the 
contemporary global world and due to the “CNN effect,”95 separate incidents in 
small peripheral villages may well become headline news all over the world and 
influence state behaviour.
According to Larry Catá Backer, compliance depends on both observation 
and the knowledge of being observed. Law can thus be understood as a 
framework for surveillance, understanding surveillance as information gathering, 
assessment, and even judgment in the eyes of the beholder. Surveillance can thus 
be understood as “a new form of lawmaking through which the old boundaries 
between public and private, national and transnational, are made irrelevant.”96 
It represents a shifting of coercive power from the external and hierarchically 
superior (the state, the police, and the institution) to the internal (the individual 
and the private).97 Surveillance has accordingly morphed from an element of 
94. The rationale that was behind the current formulation of the laws of occupation was that 
the occupied civil population is the weakest object, and is therefore in need of institutional 
protection. See especially the rules of the Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949, Can TS 1965/20, UKTS 039/1958 
(entered into force 21 October 1950) [Geneva Convention]. See also the Hague Convention 
(IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907, Can TS 1942/6, UKTS 009/1910 
(entered into force 26 January 1909) [Hague Convention]. 
95. The “CNN effect” refers to the idea that real-time communication technology could provoke 
major responses from domestic audiences and political elites to global events. It is commonly 
connected with armed Western interventions in humanitarian cases. See e.g. Robinson, 
“The CNN Effect,” supra note 9 at 301; Robinson, The Myth of News, supra note 9 at 1-2; 
Eytan Gilboa, “The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of International 
Relations” (2005) 22:1 Pol Comm 27 at 28 [Gilboa, “The CNN Effect”]; Eytan Gilboa, 
“Global Television News and Foreign Policy: Debating the CNN Effect” (2005) 6:3 Int’l 
Stud Persp 325 at 326 [Gilboa, “Global Television”]. But see Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Focus 
on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact on Conflict Management is 
Invisible And Indirect” (2000) 37:2 J Peace Research 131 at 131-32; Bob, supra note 9 at 36.
96. Backer, supra note 49 at 105.
97. Ibid at 112. 
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governance “to the basis of governance itself.”98 As Backer concludes, “in its 
modern form, surveillance represents another step in the perfection of social 
panopticism.”99
B’Tselem’s Shooting Back project is just such a step in the perfection of 
social panopticism. Bentham’s two principles of power—visibility and un-verifi-
ability—are manifested in the project. Once the existence of the project had been 
published, soldiers serving in the OT must have become aware of the possibility 
that their actions would be visible. These actions are now visible not only to 
the local population that has no significant power against the army, or solely to 
journalists whose access to high-conflict areas may be restricted, but also to the 
Israeli and international public, as well as to the enforcement bodies not present 
at the scene. Illegal and criminal acts, or acts that can be portrayed as legitimate 
when edited to reflect a desired narrative, can now be video-documented by 
the local population present at the scene.100 Particularly in a state of belligerent 
occupation, where an army has to handle complex situations in highly populated 
areas, the visibility effect is intensified. 
It is important to remember the legal context of Israel’s occupation of 
the “occupied” territories of the West Bank: there is little doubt that Israel 
has been occupying these territories since the war of 1967. The International 
Court of Justice confirmed Israel’s position as the occupying power in its 2004 
(non-binding) advisory opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.101 This legal view is not shared 
by the Israeli government, which uses instead of “occupied territories” the 
98. Ibid at 145.
99. Ibid at 112.
100. In Borberg & Korea Sentencing, this fact was discussed, particularly taking into account the 
hostile mindset against the IDF of the Palestinians filming the incident, but these issues were 
considered irrelevant, as the prosecution claimed that
even if it was filmed by elements hostile to the State of Israel and the IDF warriors, out of a 
desire to harm the image of the state, in the case discussed, these elements documented the 
actions of the defendants, in a way which coincides with the determination of the facts in the 
judgment, a determination which was not based on viewing the film. 
 Supra note 41 at 13 [translated by authors].
101. [2004] ICJ Rep 136. This view was, unsurprisingly, affirmed in a United Nations General 
Assembly resolution of the same year. See Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice 
on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem, GA Res ES-10/15UNGAOR, 10th Sess, UN Doc 
A/5 (2004).
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term “disputed territories,”102 while—significantly—applying military law to 
the civilian “Palestinian inhabitants,” which reinforces the “occupation” view. 
Consequently, the Israeli Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice 
seems to follow international legal opinion that Israel has held “the West Bank in 
belligerent occupation since 1967.”103 The Court has also made it clear that the 
rules of IHL (the Law of Armed Conflict) are to apply.104
Our discussion of enforcement and visibility has to be seen against the 
backdrop of the legal and political debate revolving around the nature of Israel’s 
occupation of land outside the Green Line.105 Since a significant part of the 
enforcement of the public order by the occupying power occurs in or around 
villages and towns, illegal actions occurring in this context can now be made 
visible more easily. The fact that cameras are given to a relatively large number 
of families in each area intensifies the effect of visibility. The mere presence of 
cameras and the filming of incidents cannot be outlawed, as is perhaps desired 
by the army. Therefore, even if the army is aware of the source of the filming, 
it does not usually have the operational capability or legal authority to limit 
the movement of the filming individual or family. Unlike pure eyewitness 
testimonies, which can be easily discredited and are difficult to communicate 
to the global public, video footage is easily transferable and leaves a distinct, 
though subjective, account of a given incident, thus emphasizing the saying that 
“a picture is worth a thousand words.”106 
The second principle of power, un-verifiability, is also significantly present 
in this example. The filming of an incident is not done from an identifiable 
position, as in cases where journalists are allowed to accompany ground forces 
102. “Disputed Territories: Forgotten Facts About the West Bank and Gaza Strip” Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (1 February 2003), online: <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/2003Pages/
DISPUTED TERRITORIES-Forgotten Facts About the We.aspx>.
103. Beit Sourik Village Council v Israel (2004), HCJ 2056/04, 129 ILR 189.
104. For some of these rules, see e.g. Hague Convention, supra note 94; Geneva Convention, supra 
note 94. 
105. The “Green Line” is the armistice line that was put in place in 1949 after the fighting 
between Israel and Jordan as part of Israel’s War of Independence. Though this armistice 
line was clearly defined as not representing a final boundary, since its definition this line has 
become the unofficial border and the basis for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority. See Ruth Wedgewood, “The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence 
and the Limits of Self-Defense” (2005) 99:1 AJIL 52 at 55-56.
106. Significant literature has been written on the influence of photography (including selective 
photography) on human rights and international law. See e.g. Sharon Sliwinski, Human 
Rights In Camera (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011); Ariella Azoulay, The Civil 
Contract of Photography (Brooklyn, NY: Zone Books, 2008); Daniel Joyce, “Photography and 
the Image-Making of International Justice” (2010) 4:2 L & Human 229.
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as “embedded journalists” or to document from a specific observation point. 
Moreover, the army does not know which families or individuals have cameras 
and which do not. The emphasis on “passive image-making”107 intensifies the 
vagueness of the source of surveillance. Even if a soldier knows who owns a 
camera, he or she does not know if at any particular moment that individual is 
operating the camera, if the camera has been passed on to somebody else, or if 
the camera is functional at all.
Foucault encouraged others to adapt his work to fit their interests as he 
himself had done with the works of Friedrich Nietzsche and others.108 B’Tselem’s 
camera distribution project exemplifies the potential panopticon structure in the 
law of occupation. The traditional conception of the law of occupation is that the 
occupying state is responsible for maintaining public order, and it is up to that 
state, or others in some cases, to prosecute soldiers who commit crimes and other 
violations of the laws of war.109 Power is therefore experienced in a traditional 
way that enshrines the public-private divide and makes the state more powerful 
by accentuating its status as supreme over all private actors. This conception of 
power requires constant surveillance of the civil population by the army. 
The Shooting Back project advances a different kind of surveillance, that of 
the army by the civil population, facilitated by the availability of NGO resources 
and media technology. The situation therefore exhibits what Foucault referred 
to as a “diabolical aspect” of panopticism: the panopticon is “a machine in 
which everyone is caught, those who exercise power, just as much as those over 
whom it is exercised.”110 Power is no longer identified with a single individual (or 
authority); everyone plays the role of an overseer in the machine.111 The army’s 
duty in the territories is to maintain public order, and for that reason it is the 
overseer of the civil population. Members of the civil population are, perhaps for 
the first time, able to complete the structure of the panopticon, as they have also 
become actors who oversee the actions of the army and its compliance with the 
rules of IHL. 
This developing panoptic structure, which has the potential to influence 
the balance of power between the strong and the weak, constitutes a significant 
evolution for the enforcement of international law in general and IHL in particular. 
107. Gross interview, supra note 20. 
108. Knights, supra note 6 at 576.
109. Geneva Convention, supra note 94 at paras 146-49.
110. Foucault, Power/knowledge, supra note 7 at 156.
111. Ibid at 152, 154-56.
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In line with the scholarship on compliance,112 visibility in the panopticon, 
inherent to its structure, restricts not only the freedom of the “inmates” in the 
cells as the weak, but also the freedom of the “guard” as the strong. By increasing 
visibility in the structure of the panopticon, the guard’s violations of law become 
visible as well. The structure of the panopticon encourages the “guard” to step 
away from misconduct, as it would be visible to all. Similarly, in the case of the 
Shooting Back project, the presence of cameras provides enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary with evidence required for conducting effective investigations 
and bringing successful disciplinary and criminal charges against transgressors. 
This positive assessment of the project seems to correspond with the responses 
B’Tselem has received from the army and the police, who utilize the information 
provided by B’Tselem as evidence in their investigations into acts of misconduct 
and criminal behaviour.113 
 The effect of visibility is not limited to the particular violator and his actions. 
The greater level of transparency brought by the video coverage increases the 
overall cost of non-compliance for the state. The spread of cameras in a globally 
oriented society aids in the monitoring of potential violations and facilitates the 
wider distribution of such knowledge. Therefore, the state has to improve its 
procedures and safeguard their enforcement in order to reduce transgressions by 
individual violators. The state as a whole may become immediately subject to 
global scrutiny due to the transgressions of an individual soldier. Hence, the cost 
of non-compliance is escalated due to the larger risk of documented non-compli-
ance, potential civil damage claims, and litigation, as well as the potential damage 
to the occupying power’s overall legitimacy and public image. 
As outlined above, legitimacy plays an important role in the exercise of 
power. Illegitimate and purely repressive uses of power lead people to oppose 
it. Occupation itself is mostly considered “a factual, rather than a normative 
112. See e.g. Börzel, Hofmann & Sprungk, supra note 10 at 15-16; Tallberg, supra note 10 at 
611-12; George W Downs, David M Rocke & Peter N Barsoom, “Is the Good News about 
Compliance Good News about Cooperation?” (1996) 50:3 Int’l Org 379 at 379; James 
D Fearon, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation” (1998) 52:2 Int’l 
Org 269 at 269; Alan E Boyle, “Saving the World? Implementation and Enforcement of 
International Environmental Law Through International Institutions” (1991) 3:2 J Envtl L 
229 at 229; S Tarrow, “Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International 
Political” (2001) 4:1 Ann Rev Pol Sci 1.
113. Gross interview, supra note 20.
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phenomenon.”114 It is considered to be only temporary in nature, a limited period 
of time when IHL has to be observed, and at the end of which the territory and 
its resources should be returned to the original sovereign. Positive public opinion, 
both domestic and international, is one of the main sources of legitimacy for an 
occupying power today. The appearance of video footage that questions the level 
of compliance with IHL in the occupied territory may actually delegitimize the 
occupation both internationally and domestically, a development that in turn 
may decrease the power of the occupying state.115
It seems that in the case of B’Tselem’s camera distribution project, the 
NGO, using technology provided by media corporations, empowered the local 
population by providing it with the means to become an overseer of the level of 
compliance with IHL rules by the army and border police. Transnational actors 
in this case may have altered the balance of power by spreading knowledge and 
therefore creating the conditions for a panopticon structure. 
International law in general could be changing through the introduction 
of panoptic structures in a global, transnational, and technologically oriented 
society. Bentham said that the structure of the panopticon would be applicable 
to “all establishments whatsoever, in which within a space not too large to be 
covered or commanded by buildings, a number of persons are meant to be kept 
under inspection.”116 The spread of easily accessible information facilitated by 
the presence of available technology like the cameras provided by B’Tselem or 
Twitter updates from the streets of Cairo during the so-called Arab Spring of 
2011 serves as the “buildings” in the structure of the panopticon while at the 
same time possessing the capability to bring knowledge to every corner of the 
world. The question of whether rules of international law are adhered to is not 
monitored from a single location. Instead, each camera becomes a monitoring 
instrument and platform that provides knowledge and limits the ability of the 
transgressor to violate rules without being exposed.
The case of the Shooting Back project presents one example of how transna-
tional private actors are increasingly involved in achieving overall compliance with 
international law. It is perhaps the most crystallized version of the indirect role 
and impact of transnational actors on such compliance. In this case, B’Tselem did 
114. Orna Ben-Naftali, Aeyal M Gross & Keren Michaeli, “Illegal Occupation: Framing the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory” (2005) 23:3 Berkeley J Int’l L 551 at 552. See also Eyal 
Benvenisti, The International Law of Occupation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1993).
115. James Fallows, “Who Shot Mohammed Al-Dura?” The Atlantic (June 2003), online: <https://
www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/issues/2003/06/fallows.htm>.
116. Bentham, supra note 11 at 2.
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not choose simply to pressure the Israeli government to investigate the alleged 
violations reported by the local population. Rather, it chose to provide the state 
with knowledge that affected its use of power, while at the same time empowering 
the local population. B’Tselem provided the state with knowledge that it could 
not have received in other ways. Although states are responsible for the implemen-
tation and enforcement of the law of occupation, they are at times unable to 
monitor effectively certain areas and are thus dependent on assistance from other 
actors. In our global age, this monitoring role can be best fulfilled by NGOs and 
the media. Perhaps monitoring by NGOs and the media could also be a fruitful 
approach to compliance with international law in areas of limited statehood.117
IV. CONCLUSION
Non-state transnational actors are not the ultimate solution to the problem of 
ensuring compliance in international law. Perhaps they are not even a good 
solution—they may have a democratic deficit, be dependent on external funding, 
have their own partisan interests, be highly politicized, or be designed to maximize 
their own profits.118 However, they are already influencing compliance, and their 
role should be properly analyzed and understood before being dismissed. 
117. Thomas Risse & Ursula Lehmkuhl, “Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood – New 
Modes of Governance?” (SFB 700 Governance Working Paper No 1, December 2006). 
118. See e.g. Bob, supra note 9; Steve Charnovitz, “Nongovernmental Organizations and 
International Law” (2006) 100:2 AJIL 348; Gilboa, “Global Television,” supra note 95; 
Alan Hudson, “NGOs’ Transnational Advocacy Networks: From ‘Legitimacy’ to ‘Political 
Responsibility’?” (2001) 1:4 Global Networks 331; Jakobsen, supra note 95; Timothy W 
Luke & Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “On videocameralistics: the geopolitics of failed states, the 
CNN International and (UN)governmentality” (1997) 4:4 Rev Int’l Pol Eco 709; Robinson, 
“The CNN Effect”, supra note 9; Gerald M Steinberg, “Manipulating the marketplace 
of ideas,” Haaretz (27 November 2009), online: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/1131105.html>.
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The recognition that NGOs and the media have significant powers and 
affect international policy is not new.119 However, the mechanisms by which they 
employ their power are underexplored. B’Tselem’s camera distribution project 
presents an interesting example of the way that NGOs can empower the weaker 
side by providing them with an opportunity to publicize knowledge. B’Tselem’s 
project eventually promoted a situation where, in Hebron today, people prefer to 
walk with cameras as they feel more protected.120 This empowerment also affords 
great powers to the NGO itself. As Gross described, he is now often approached 
by top-level military and police officers seeking information and knowledge 
from his organization whenever an incident occurs.121 The IDF is committed to 
universal moral values, and the value and dignity of human rights are central to its 
legitimacy. In this light, the knowledge provided by organizations like B’Tselem 
enables the IDF to function better and its well-developed internal investigation 
mechanisms to work more efficiently.122 Furthermore, the IDF itself is training 
combat soldiers to carry cameras in order to present its side of the story.123
The case of B’Tselem’s camera distribution project was not selected for being 
a typical NGO enforcement advocacy project, but rather for its uniqueness and 
innovation. The concept of this project erodes yet another aspect of sovereignty: 
traditional formal sovereignty rested on principles of sovereign equality and 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of another state, according to which 
each state decided how to deal with enemy populations and with its own troops 
who defied the laws of war. With time, these concepts were narrowed down 
by clarification and eventually the codification of the universal laws of war, 
119. Philip Alston, ed, Non-State Actors and Human Rights (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005); Backer, supra note 49; Niklas Egels-Zandén & Peter Hyllman, “Exploring the Effects 
of Union – NGO Relationships on Corporate Responsibility: The Case of the Swedish Clean 
Clothes Campaign” (2006) 64:3 J Bus Ethics 303; Gilboa, “The CNN Effect,” supra note 95; 
Gilboa, “Global Television,” supra note 95; Volker Heins, Nongovernmental organizations in 
international society (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008); Jakobsen, supra note 95; Luke 
& Tuathail, supra note 118; Martin-Ortega, “Business,” supra note 3; Olga Martin-Ortega, 
“Deadly Ventures? Multinational Corporations and Paramilitaries in Colombia” (2008) 16 
Revista Electronica De Estudios Internacionales 1; Jason McNichol, “Transnational NGO 
Certification Programs as New Regulatory Forms: Lessons from the Forestry Sector” in 
Marie-Laure Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, eds, Transnational Governance: Institutional 
Dynamics of Regulation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 349; Kathrin 
Zippel, “Transnational Advocacy Networks and Policy Cycles in the European Union: The 
Case of Sexual Harassment” (2004) 11:1 Soc Pol 57.
120. Gross interview, supra note 20; Y Azoulay, supra note 15; Kalman & Smith, supra note 14.
121. Gross interview, supra note 20.
122. Israel Defense Forces, “Doctrine,” online: <http://www.idf.il/1497-en/Dover.aspx>.
123. Kalman & Smith, supra note 14; The Associated Press, supra note 14.
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the establishment of greater enforcement mechanisms by international bodies 
(human rights courts, human rights committees, and international criminal 
tribunals), and the acquiescence (even though restrictive) to extend universal 
criminal jurisdiction of states over the crimes of individual perpetrators from 
other states (which incorporates the idea that one state can have a moral virtue 
over another). B’Tselem’s project opens another perspective on the change that is 
taking place in the structure of power/knowledge in our globalized and transna-
tional society. Private transnational actors supply information and knowledge to 
all those actively seeking it. The state is no longer the sole source and master of 
knowledge as it feels increasingly unable to filter and control the information it 
wishes to publicize. The relevant power structures, as well as our understanding 
of them, should be adapted to better reflect this transition. Is this transition 
a further erosion of the formal concepts of sovereignty or merely a technolog-
ical change that will eventually cause states to restrict the flow of information 
through legal and technical counter-measures? The flow of information and 
knowledge opens the door for new forms and mechanisms of enforcement that 
may eventually increase enforcement of and compliance with international law. 
Enforcement is impossible without knowledge. Even if there is a will for 
compliance, the practical inability to gather knowledge about violations occasion-
ally prevents potential compliance. Gathering and transmitting knowledge, as in 
the Shooting Back project, can be a role for transnational actors in this structure 
of compliance with international law. The wide dissemination of cameras 
in high-conflict areas, conjointly with the strategy of passive image-making, 
allow the widest array of coverage of the situation, unachievable by traditional 
means. Shooting Back simply provides knowledge and this is perhaps its greatest 
achievement to date.
